BIOMASS HUB

Last week, world leaders emerged from the two-week Copenhagen conference (COP-15) with an accord falling well short of the legally binding agreement many had argued was necessary to combat the worst effects of human-induced climate change.  Reports suggest that the deal was brokered in large part by 11^th-hour bargaining by President Obama with China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, which skirted a diplomatic impasse that took negotiators through an all-night marathon session.

At its heart, the document aspires to reduce carbon emissions enough in order to prevent an increase in average global temperatures in excess of 2 degrees C (3.6 degrees F) since preindustrial times.  But with no new emission cuts pledged and experts predicting an increase of 3.9 degrees C (7 degrees F) above preindustrial levels, many argue that the commitment is an impossible target.

The COP “took note” of the Copenhagen Accord, which means that the document remains an aspirational commitment among signatories, which subjects them only to “political consequences” in the event of a breach (e.g. diplomatic responses, public shaming, withholding discretionary funding, etc.).  Since international diplomacy is by its nature a drawn out process, it could be months to years before a binding agreement is signed.

To be fair, with a slumping global economy draining political will and lethargy in the U.S. Senate raising questions about U.S. climate leadership, expectations were low heading into Copenhagen.  Just weeks before the conference kicked off on December 7^th, world leaders announced they would pursue a two-step strategy, which included a framework agreement as a foundation for follow-up talks in Mexico City in December 2010.

To this end, the accord seems to have delivered with provisions that include aid to developing countries, transparency, and most notably, commitments among the world’s major economies to curb emissions and report actions.  And by breaking a diplomatic stalemate between the world’s developed countries and the leading developing nations (Brazil, India, China, and South Africa), the legacy of Copenhagen could be a reframing of climate diplomacy.  Divisions between the two interests have resulted in a perpetual impasse that has slowly eroded Kyoto’s efficacy and thwarted recent efforts to reach an international agreement.

With pledges on all sides achieved through the accord, momentum could be building towards a comprehensive treaty.  A look through the agreements major provisions tells the story.

First, the accord represents the first time that all major economies (including emitters) have made commitments to curb global warming pollution while subjecting those emissions to “international consultations and analysis” (aka signatories will report their actions). Though these commitments are not particularly ambitious, this latter point is especially encouraging in anticipation of future talks.

As mentioned above, perhaps the most difficult obstacle for international consensus on climate change has been the rift between developed and developing countries.  Developed countries that have long enjoyed the benefits of industrialization and resulting economic prosperity want to hold developing countries accountable for their emissions as they modernize their economies.  Developing countries, including China, India, and Brazil, argue that they should be exempt from having to report their emissions so long as they are playing industrial catch-up.

Getting China on board is a huge breakthrough, especially in light of the growing economic powerhouse’s willingness to exercise its expanding influence and stubbornness during the Copenhagen negotiations.  Although China forced a roll-back of emissions reduction commitments, they are now not only putting numbers on the table with a pledge to join the global fight to reduce climate pollution, they have agreed to open their books on their rising emissions and allow a transparent review of their progress toward their emission pledge.  Most notably for the U.S., the China excuse often used in Capital Hill to resist climate legislation is now off the table, which could lead to progress on the Senate climate bill.

Second, the accord establishes the first ever green climate fund in the amount of 30 billion dollars for 2010-2012 and 100 billion per year by 2020 “to support projects, programs, policies and other activities in developing countries related to mitigation including REDD-plus, adaptation, capacity building, technology development and transfer.”

The transfer of resources signifies an acknowledgment among developed countries that they need to support the developing world’s efforts to adapt to climate change and mitigate their emissions.  But missing from the accord’s provisions, are specific mechanisms for addressing widespread deforestation and land-use change, a problem that has mired efforts to ramp up worldwide biofuel production.

Third, while the U.S. is largely to blame for holding up efforts to build an international regime to tackle climate change over the last decade, Obama may have single-handedly salvaged the country’s reputation and restored its leadership role by building consensus among major emitters. The key for Obama will be to use any political capital he gained in Copenhagen to drive through the Senate’s climate bill in time for Mexico City.  If Congress fails to deliver, the EPA will be poised to implement regulations around greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.  Many officials, including those in the Obama Administration, view this as the nuclear option since any preemptive EPA action will undermine the legislative process and become the subject of litigation that could delay action for several years.

The accord is available here.

Image: Flickr/Nils van Rooijen